Abstract Fictional truth, or truth in fiction/pretense, has been the object of extended scrutiny among philosophers and logicians in recent decades. Comparatively little attention, however, has been paid to its inferential relationships with time and with certain deliberate and contingent human activities, namely, the creation of fictional works. The aim of the paper is to contribute to filling the gap. Toward this goal, a formal framework is outlined that is consistent with a variety of conceptions of fictional truth and based upon a specific formal treatment of time and agency, that of so-called stit logics. Moreover, a complete axiomatic theory of fiction-making TFM is defined, where fiction-making is understood as the exercise of agency and choice in time over what is fictionally true. The language L of TFM is an extension of the language of propositional logic, with the addition of temporal and modal operators. A distinctive feature of L with respect to other modal languages is a variety of operators having to do with fictional truth, including a 'fictionality' operator M (to be read as "it is a fictional truth that"). Some applications of TFM are outlined, and some interesting linguistic and inferential phenomena, which are not so easily dealt with in other frameworks, are accounted for.
Introduction
We ordinarily regard works of fiction as creations, that is, as the outcomes of certain deliberate, self-conscious activities. We would likely balk, however, if asked to specify what these activities consist of. After all, fiction-making is seldom a linear process flowing from the work plan to the final editing-most often, it is a piecemeal collection of human miseries involving trials, errors, ephemeral inspirations, and strokes of luck. Furthermore, as you may guess, different types of fiction lend themselves to dramatically different processes of fiction-making; consider the production of a high-grossing movie compared to the telling of a goodnight tale.
Therefore, one might argue, fiction-making is too messy a phenomenon to be the topic of decently precise philosophical investigation. However, that might be a hasty conclusion. For instance, theory-revision is currently a well respected field of study, even though real-life theory-revision processes may often be highly unsystematic. This is possible insofar as we idealize away from certain details of the phenomena to be described, and we focus instead on their core features, or at least on those core features that are amenable to a fair treatment at a given stage of inquiry.
One of the most important and less disputed core features of fictional works is that they are endowed with (representational or propositional) content. When we say that certain propositions are true in a work of fiction-that they are fictional truths of that work-we are saying that they are part of the content of the work (see Ross 1997) . And it is out of discussion that the creation of a work is a deliberate process that leads to the work, typically through a sequence of intermediate stages or drafts. Thus, it is only natural to think of fiction-making as a deliberate process leading to a certain content, typically through a series of intermediate contents. Let us call this view the content-choice conception of fiction-making. This paper has three main aims. The first is to outline a general logical framework in which the content-choice conception can be made precise, and which paves the way for a more detailed study of the inferential relationships between fictional truth, time, and agency. Here, the content-choice conception is elaborated against the background of a specific view of time and agency, that of so-called stit logics (see Belnap et al. 2001 for a general overview). The second aim is to define a formal theory of fictionmaking TFM, which is understood to encode (what is essential to) the content-choice conception. In spite of its limited expressive resources, TFM allows us to formulate and formally check a variety of distinctions concerning fiction and fiction-making. The third and final aim is to make a convincing case that a better understanding of the relationships between fictional truth, time, and agency comes with a better grasp of our common discourse about fiction and of its metaphysical underpinnings.
In recent decades, the content of fictional and representational artworks have been thoroughly investigated, from both a formal and an informal viewpoint (see, for instance, Blocker 1974; Woods 1974; Lewis 1978; Bertolet 1984a; Evans 1982, pp. 353-372; Walton 1990, pp. 138-187; Bonomi and Zucchi 2003; Nossum 2003; Woods and Alward 2004; Hill 2012) . On the other hand, the concepts of action and performance have been assigned a key role in a variety of aesthetic and ontological theories of art, fiction, and their content (see Wolterstorff 1980; Walton 1990; Currie 1989 Currie , 1990 Currie , 2010 Kivy 2006 , to mention but a few examples). To the best of my knowledge, however, TFM is the first axiomatic theory that explicitly concerns the relationship between action (or, perhaps more appropriately, agency) and the content of fictional works and other representational artifacts, performances or contexts.
TFM is a simple extension of a propositional tense-modal multi-agent stit logic. Like all standard stit logics, and in contrast to other proposals in the formal study of action (for instance so-called dynamic logics), TFM does not directly deal with actions. Its focus is, rather, on agents and the (possible) outcomes of their actions. This feature makes it especially well suited to cope with the content-choice conception, which is only concerned with authors and their achievements and not with the specific actions they perform. As an axiomatic stit theory, TFM may be classified in the same family as other intensional extensions of stit logic, such as the epistemic logics proposed by Broersen (see, e.g., Broersen 2008a, b) . In the wider realm of stit accounts, the proposal that is closest in spirit to the one pursued here is probably Wansing's (2002 Wansing's ( , 2006 stit-theoretic approach to belief formation. Now we shall proceed as follows. The first section is mainly devoted to an informal presentation of both the logical framework and TFM. It is also meant to introduce a bit of terminology and some basic notions from the philosophical study of fiction, time, and agency. In the second section, some interesting applications of both TFM and the underlying general framework are outlined and discussed. In the third and last section TFM is formally defined and shown to be complete.
Background notions and an outline of the proposal

Fictional truth and content: some background notions
How easy is a bush supposed a bear!
Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream
Since Kendall Walton's groundbreaking Mimesis as Make-Believe, the notion of fictional truth has been commonly tied to that of a make-believe game. A make-believe game is an imaginative activity that is based upon a number of bridge-rules or principles of generation. In a make-believe game, certain propositions are to be imagined as true. These are the fictional truths of the game. The fictional truths of a make-believe game are ideally determined by what is actually the case in the relevant context and by the principles of generation at work in the game. As an example, a Shakespeareinspired, bush-bear make-believe game involves a principle of generation that we might formulate as "A bush counts as a bear." By virtue of this principle, whenever, say, a player is close to a bush, it is fictionally true that the player is close to a bear.
The fictional truths of a make-believe game are, intuitively, propositions that are true in the game. Analogously, we may speak of the fictional truths of a novel, of a movie, and more generally of a work of fiction to indicate the propositions that are true in the work. The same goes for other entities that we would not immediately classify either as make-believe games or works of fiction, for instance normative or communicative contexts and theatrical performances. In what follows, I shall adopt a broad conception of fictional truth and regard all these things as legitimate sources of fictional truths. Moreover, I shall use the expression fictional setting as an umbrella term that covers all of them. Thus, for instance, a bush-bear game, a performance of A Midsummer Night's Dream, a literary work like War and Peace, and your best game of Angry Birds all count as fictional settings in my sense. Like Walton, I assume that not just make-believe games but also fictional works and other fictional settings may be said to have principles of generation. For instance, the so-called say-so principle (roughly: whatever is said to be the case is fictionally the case) is naturally thought of as a standard principle of generation of literary fiction.
Throughout this paper, fictional discourse is used as a generic term to indicate any discourse that is about or is strictly related to works of fiction and other fictional settings. A key role in fictional discourse is played by so-called internal sentences 1 such as:
(1) Mickey Mouse wears gloves.
(2) Holmes met Watson in a lab.
Internal sentences are so called because they are accounts of what occurs in a novel, a movie or, more generally, in a fictional setting. If they are relative to a specific setting, we shall also say that they are internal to that setting. 2 For instance, (2) is naturally understood as internal to Conan Doyle's A Study in Scarlet. Note that a sentence may be internal without being internal to any specific setting. It seems perfectly possible, for example, that a sentence like (1) is uttered without having any specific fictional setting in mind. 3 Internal sentences may be contrasted with explicit reports of fictional settings, such as: Statements like these have been called (internal) metafictional sentences (Kroon and Voltolini 2011) . In the analysis of metafictional sentences, I borrow the 'fictionality' operator M f (read: "It is a fictional truth of setting f that") and its generic counterpart M ("It is a fictional truth that") from the language of TFM. Thus, for instance, I write "M (Mickey Mouse wears gloves)" instead of (3).
Intuitively, metafictional sentences are constructions we use to describe a certain content (see Ross 1997, pp. 4-5) . To assert that M f A is to say that (the proposition expressed by) A is part of the content of f or, in other words, that the content of f is partly determined by A's being a fictional truth of f . For this reason, in what follows, we shall use "being a fictional truth of f " and "being part of the content of f " interchangeably. Arguably, the content of a work of fiction, so understood, is not to be identified with its explicit content, that is, with the content that the work explicitly represents or conveys. The reason is that the fictional truths of a work need not be part of its explicit content (see, e.g., Lewis 1978, p. 41) . Conan Doyle, for instance, never bothered to tell us that Holmes had two nostrils, but that is nonetheless true in the Holmes stories. We shall set explicit content aside in what follows, and focus on fictional truth, for reasons of logical tractability and because the notion of explicit content is very difficult to characterize when non-purely-linguistic works such as movies or paintings are at stake (see Ross 1997, pp. 33-54 for a discussion).
Most philosophers think that, for many purposes, it is useful to replace internal sentences with suitably chosen metafictional sentences. According to this view, for instance, (1) is usefully paraphrased as (3) and (2), assuming that it is uttered during a discussion about A Study in Scarlet, as (4). We shall call this view the paraphrase thesis. The paraphrase thesis may be made precise in various ways, depending on the purpose the paraphrase is supposed to serve. I shall remain neutral on whether the paraphrase should reveal the meaning of the original sentence, or capture the speaker's communicative intentions. I assume, however, that an adequate paraphrase should be a better guide than the original sentence to what the speaker is committing her/himself to or, at least, not a worse one. 4 Given this assumption, it is natural to hold that the relation of paraphrasability at stake is transitive. If stands for such a relation, the paraphrase thesis may be roughly 5 expressed as follows:
In certain circumstances, if it is clear that A is internal to a specific setting f , A M f (A).
Time and agency: some background notions
Now it is time to introduce some basic notions in the temporal logic of agency. 6 (Those familiar with the topic might want to skip all of this section but the last paragraph.) As is common in the formal study of agency, we assume as a working hypothesis that an indeterministic, branching-time conception is correct. In the branching-time conception, reality is represented as a tree of complete possible courses of affairs or histories (also called possible worlds). Intuitively, histories may be thought of as sequences of successive 'world-slices' or moments. We let h, h , . . . vary over histories and m, m , . . . , w, w , . . . vary over moments, and we write m ≺ m (m m ) to indicate that m precedes (follows) m in time.
A history is said to pass through a certain moment if, informally, that moment occurs on that history. In Fig. 1 , for instance, history h passes through moments m, m and m . Two histories are said to share a moment m if they both pass through m; they are said to branch or divide at m if m is the last moment they share; finally, they are said to be undivided at m if they share m and do not branch at m. In Fig. 1 , for instance, histories h and h share moments m, m , divide at m , and are undivided at m (but not at m ).
We assume that trees satisfy three basic conditions, namely, (i) trees are unbounded to the left and to the right; (ii) any two histories in a tree share some moment (Tree condition); (iii) if two histories in a tree share a moment, they share any previous moment (No backward branching condition).
Sometimes, intuitively, we speak about alternative simultaneous states of affairs (e.g., "Now I am awake but I could have been sleeping"). Ordinary trees, however, are 'blind' to such a relation of simultaneity. Since fictional works may obviously involve alternative simultaneous states of affair (say alternative versions of the Battle of Hastings), we need to extend a little bit the conceptual framework introduced thus far. We shall do that by adopting a novel temporal notion, that of an instant. We may think of an instant as an equivalence class of simultaneous moments (see, e.g., Belnap et al. 2001, pp. 194-196 ; below, the notion of an instant is formally defined in a slightly different way; see Definition 6). Intuitively, to say that moments m and m are in the same instant is to say that they occur simultaneously, maybe on different histories. Moreover, we require trees to be synchronized (Di Maio and Zanardo 1994) , that is, to contain only histories that share an isomorphic temporal ordering (this is ensured by condition SYNCHRONICITY below). Intuitively, this means that any moment is in some instant and that any instant intersects each history at precisely one moment. Figure 1 is a partial representation of a synchronized tree.
TFM is a modal logic, more precisely a multi-agent stit logic. As usual in modal logic, truth is relativized to certain parameters or points (of evaluation). A point corresponds to a pair whose elements are a history and a moment that passes through it. We write m/ h to abbreviate (m, h) and, at the same time, indicate that m passes through h. These complicated points are needed to deal with sentences whose truth value may depend on future courses of events-and thus on the 'history' parameter. Atomic sentences (propositional letters) are assumed to "have no trace of futurity in them" (Prior 1967, p. 124) , that is, to have the same truth value at all points that correspond to the same moment.
Stit logics revolve around a family of 'agency' operators stit (read: "sees to it that"). Intuitively, if α is an agent or a group of agents, and "A " a sentence, to say that α stit A is to say that α ensures or guarantees that A.
Standard stit logics represent actions and choices just in terms of the constraints that these impose on future courses of events. Moreover, they are idealized in many respects; for instance, they ignore the complications raised by vagueness, probability, the actual (non-null) duration of actions and choices, and the role of intentions and beliefs in the understanding of agency. TFM shares these limitations.
A central semantic notion in stit logics is that of a (possible) choice. A possible choice of an agent at a given moment m is a set of histories, which corresponds, intuitively, to a certain outcome that the agent is in a position to force at m. For instance, since I can now ensure that I am going to type a star (so: *), the class of histories on which I am going to type a star is presently a possible choice of mine. In standard multi-agent stit logics, possible choices obey two basic constraints. First, we have the No choice between undivided history (Noch) constraint: if two histories are undivided at moment m, then, for any agent α, they are precisely in the same possible choices of α at m. Noch makes it apparent that choices, as they are conceived in stit logics, are not vague intentions or wishful thoughts: to choose a possible outcome rather than another is to make an immediate difference in what is going to happen. The second constraint, Independence of agents (Indag), requires, intuitively, that the possible choices of distinct agents at a moment all be independent: it cannot be the case that a possible choice of an agent at a moment m is incompatible with some possible choice(s) of some other agent(s) at m. This requirement is reasonable: intuitively, an agent cannot be in a position to force a certain outcome if, at the same moment, one or more other agents can prevent that very outcome.
Many different stit operators are available in the philosophical market. A very common one is called Chellas stit (after Chellas 1969 Chellas , 1992 . A statement "α Chellassees to it that A " is true at a point m/ h iff A is true at m on all histories in the choice of α corresponding to m/ h. Chellas stit operators are simple and logically well-behaving S5 boxes. For many purposes, however, it is useful to adopt a slightly more articulated stit notion, so-called deliberative stit (von Kutschera 1986; Horty 1989) . Informally, "α (deliberately) sees to it that A " may be defined as "α Chellas-sees to it that A and it is not inevitable that A " (see Definition 4 below). The negative clause encodes the intuition that we may only deliberate upon "what is future and capable of being otherwise" (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1139b7) . Deliberative stit will be our 'official' stit notion in all informal discussions.
1.3 Fictional truth, time, and agency: an outline of the proposal The language L of TFM is an extension of the language of propositional logic, with the addition of the following tense-modal operators: -Prior's tense operators P ("it has been sometimes the case that"), F ("it will be sometimes the case that"), with duals H, G, respectively. -An operator of historical possibility or non-inevitability ♦ ("it is still not inevitable that") with dual . Stit logics are traditionally based upon so-called branching-time (BT) frames (see Belnap et al. 2001) , while the semantics of L is defined on OTF frames, which are Ockhamist frames (see Zanardo 1996) . The choice of Ockhamist frames is made here essentially for reasons of mathematical tractability. BT and Ockhamist frames, albeit nonequivalent, are strictly related and, for our purposes, the latter may be taken as fair approximations of the former.
OTF frames are Kripke frames and are defined, as usual, as n-tuples whose elements are a domain, K , and some (classes of) accessibility relations on K . The elements of K are called points (of evaluation). In Ockhamist frames it is possible to define the notions of history, moment, instant, and choice we met in the previous section. The definitions of OTF models and of the corresponding semantic notions are standard. With the exception of 'fictionality' operators, the tense-modal operators of L are known from the literature, and semantically behave as expected. 8 Given (i) some idealizations that are common in the formal study of content, (ii) an important restriction, and (iii) three background assumptions, these limited conceptual resources enable us to express a variety of theses concerning fictional truth, fictional settings, their modal properties, and their relationships with time and agency. Let us consider points (i)-(iii) in turn.
(i) The proposal is idealized in that it assumes that at each point any setting f has a single, well-determined content, and that such content reflects the common intuitions of clever and well-informed speakers on the fictional truths of f . As a consequence, we shall ignore such issues as ambiguity, obscurity, vagueness, and other potential sources of disagreement about fictional settings and their content among clever and well-informed speakers. Moreover, we shall assume that certain well-known problems involving fictional names (see, e.g., Kripke 1980, pp. 157-158) have been dealt with conveniently and possibly without invoking ad hoc, fictional entities. (ii) The proposal is restricted in that it only applies to possible fiction, that is, to fictional settings endowed with possibly true content. The rationale behind this (simplifying) restriction is that the problems raised by impossible fiction, inter-7 This informal reading is only adequate if ♦ σ is not in the scope of a tense operator.
8 See below, Sect. 3.3. For the convenience of the reader, here is an informal characterization of the truthconditions of sentences of L involving these operators (where 'true' means true in an OTF model):
A is true at all points m/ h such that h is in the same choice of α k (of some agent) as h, and (b) A is false at some point m/ h . esting as they may be on general grounds, are not immediately and specifically relevant to our discussion. 9 (iii) According to our first background assumption, a fictional setting f has some fictional truth at a point only if f exists (or, if f is an event, a performance or the like, if f has occurred or is occurring; we shall skip this specification in what follows) at that point. For instance, if the 1929 Disney's movie The Opry House had not (yet) been produced, no proposition would be a fictional truth of The Opry House. We shall call this assumption No fictional truth without fictional setting (Ntws). Besides being independently plausible, Ntws is widely presupposed in our common discourse and reasoning about fiction and fictionmaking. The second background assumption is the converse of Ntws. We shall call it No fictional setting without fictional truth (Nswt). Nswt says that having some fictional truth is essential to a fictional setting: no fictional setting may exist at a point and have no fictional truth at that point (see Ross 1997, p. 21 for a discussion). The third assumption introduces a strict connection between fiction-making and content. Let us indicate as a fictional change any change in the content of a setting (which may also consist of the creation of a setting). Now we may call the third assumption No fiction-making without fictional change (Nfwc). Nfwc says that no fiction-making performance occurs during a certain interval of time with respect to a setting f if the content of f remains the same throughout that interval. In other words, fiction-making as we shall understand it-that is, in accordance with the content-choice conception-is bound to produce some fictional change. Suppose, for instance, that you make a very small change in a literary work f (say you erase a comma), which does not affect either the identity or the content of f . In that case, your action does not count as a fiction-making performance according to Nfwc.
If no proposition is a fictional truth of f at a point m/ h, we shall say that f has a vacuos content at m/ h. A vacuous content may be safely identified with the empty set. By (i) and Nswt, at each point, each existing fictional setting corresponds to a well-determined, non-vacuous content. By restriction (ii), we may identify that content with a class of histories (intuitively, those compatible with all the fictional truths of the setting). As a consequence, fictional truth satisfies the following principle of closure:
Closure If (the proposition expressed by) A is a fictional truth of f at m/ h and B is a logical consequence of A, then B is a fictional truth of f at m/ h.
The assumptions in (iii) are not themselves expressible in L, but they allow the expression of a variety of claims about fictional settings and fiction-making. For instance, by Ntws, if a tautology is a fictional truth of f , then f exists; conversely, if a fictional setting f exists, then, by Nswt, some propositions are fictional truths of f , and by Closure, these include all tautologies. Then the formula M f (along with ♦ f , to which we shall return in a few lines) of L is true iff f exists, and can be thus regarded as a formal counterpart of " f exists."
According to Ntws, no proposition is a fictional truth of a setting f when f does not exist. On the other hand, the content-choice conception strongly suggests that f , like any other fictional setting, comes into being in time. Thus, there is some point at which no proposition, not even a tautology , is a fictional truth of f . To express this consequence using our 'fictionality' operator, we may say that there are points at which ¬M f is true. It is straightforward to conclude that M f is not a normal modal box. Since there are reasons to take 'fictionality' operators as corresponding to universal quantifications from a semantic viewpoint (see, e.g., Lewis 1978, p. 39) , we seem to have a problem. Luckily, this is a problem that admits a simple and very common solution. We may define an operator M f with the proper behavior by means of normal modal operators. The expressions of L that play this role are the modal diamond ♦ f (read: "it is compatible with the content of existing setting f that") and its dual f . Now M f A may be defined as ♦ f ∧ f A (see Definition 2 below). As a result, M f is false when f does not exist, as desired.
TFM presupposes the general framework introduced thus far. In addition, it includes as axiom schemata four basic postulates concerning fictional truth and its relationships with time and agency (see below, Sect. 3.4.2). These postulates are assumed to hold universally, for all fictional settings f (we may be interested in), relative to all moments, instants, and histories. Informally, they may be expressed as follows:
No Temporal Shift (Nts) Operator M f does not shift the instant parameter. Origin There is some moment before which f never existed. No Endless Fiction-Making (Nefm) There is a moment after which no fictionmaking performance ever occurs with respect to f . Creation If f exists, then some agent deliberately saw to it that f would exist.
Standard epistemic operators do not shift the temporal parameter, and postulate Nts ensures us, plausibly enough, that 'fictionality' operators are not exceptional in this respect. 10 Some philosophers, including most advocates of the branching-time conception, think of a tree as, quite literally, a representation of our physical universe, along with its possible causal developments. As a consequence, they are led to require that all histories in the tree are consistent with the laws of physics and are causally intertwined with one another. But then, by postulate Nts, all fictional works are bound to depict only states or events that are physically possible in a very strong sense: they must be among the possible causal developments of previous states or events of our physical universe. Arguably, this is too strong a constraint on the creativity of fiction-makers. 11 Notice that this problem only arises if the tree induced by an OTF frame is assumed to literally represent our physical universe. This assumption is not forced upon us. 12 For those philosophers who are not prepared to drop it, however, my advice is to abandon TFM in favor of a weaker theory, say TFM − , which does not encode the above Tree condition (p. 5). Intuitively, the underlying frames of TFM − , say OTF − frames, may involve a plurality of tree-like structures. One of these 'trees' can be thought to represent our physical universe, the other ones, alternative universes, causally disconnected from the former and, possibly, nomologically inconsistent with it. The content of a fictional work is still represented as a class of histories in TFM − , but these histories may be drawn from different 'trees'. As a result, one may represent our universe as a tree-like structure entirely made up of physically possible histories and, at the same time, deal with works that depict physical impossibilities. With the exception of few, mostly formal remarks, all I say about TFM and OTF frames in this paper may be restated with reference to TFM − and OTF − frames. 13 Postulate Origin entails that fictional settings come into being in time (recall that, in our framework, time extends indefinitely in both directions). Nefm says, intuitively, that no fictional setting is eternally in progress. It is clearly empirical in nature and, qua empirical postulate, hardly controversial. By assumption Nfwc, we can say that Nefm holds if, for any setting f , there exists a moment after which the (possibly vacuous) content of f remains constant. Finally, given how deliberative stit is defined (see above, p. 7, and below, Definitions 4-5), Creation requires that, for any setting f , there is some moment at which, intuitively, (i) f will exist as a matter of a choice of some agent and (ii) it is not inevitable that f will exist. Among other things, Creation entails that all fictional settings are contingent entities: for any f , there is some history on which f never exists.
To express Creation in L, the previously mentioned 'existential' stit operator [Stit] is needed. The reason that [Stit] is introduced as a primitive operator and not defined disjunctively in terms of [α 1 stit], . . . , [α t stit] has to do with fiction-making within fiction. In Hamlet, for instance, we are told about a (non-actual) play entitled The Murder of Gonzago, but nothing is said about its author. Creation entails that, in Hamlet, some agent made up the play, but not that either α 1 or . . . or α t did-unless, of course, the number of possible agents is less than or equal to t.
Postulates Origin and Creation may be philosophically controversial. To begin with, both are false if some fictional setting is a Platonic entity. In addition, Creation might fail in some special circumstances, if, for instance, a work of fiction is allowed 11 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for having brought this problem to my attention. 12 Recall that here trees are taken to extend indefinitely toward both the past and a future (see above, p. 5), a feature that makes them at least questionable as representations of the physical universe. 13 TFM − and OTF − frames are formally characterized below, in note 19. to come into existence by chance or by a non-agentive process. 14 If you admit the existence of Platonic settings, the possibility of uncreated works, or the like, you may understand the role of these postulates as methodological in character. Since we are mainly interested in fiction-making, we are entitled to restrict our attention to fictional settings that are genuinely made, that is, deliberately brought into existence. Moreover, even if false for some (possibly very peculiar) choice of f , Origin and Creation would still retain their role as part of our ordinary conception of fiction and fiction-making.
We are now in a position to provide adequate truth-conditions for sentences of the form M f i A. Namely, and informally, M f i A is true at point m/ h iff (a) the content C of f i at m/ h is nonvacuous, and (b) A is true at any point m / h such that h is in C and m is in the same instant as m. 15 In addition to Nts, Origin, Nefm and Creation, in our framework it is possible to impose further constraints on the relationships between fictional truth, time, and agency, which can be made to correspond to different sorts, or to different philosophical conceptions, of fictional settings and fictional truth. Outlining some of these constraints may be useful in gaining a better grasp of the proposal. (Below, in Sect. 3.4 .3, we shall see that the following constraints can be made to correspond to schemata of canonical formulae of L, and so to axioms of suitable extensions of TFM; for the time being, we shall limit ourselves to an informal discussion.)
Fictional settings may be classified depending on whether their existence depends, at least sometimes, on future states of affairs-in other words, on whether there is any 'trace of futurity' in their existence conditions. To this goal, let us say that a setting is objectual if, whenever it exists (occurs), it is historically necessary that it exists (occurs) and non-objectual otherwise. Arguably, all object-like fictional settings such as novels or paintings (as opposed, for instance, to event-like settings such as theatrical or narrative performances) are objectual in this sense. On the other hand, if events are modally fragile (could not have been significantly different from what they actually are), as is plausible, then all or nearly all event-like fictional settings are non-objectual. To see why, consider a narrative performance f ; arguably, there is always an initial stage at which it is still unsettled whether what actually takes place is f or some distinct performance that shares with f an initial temporal part.
Fictional settings may also be classified depending on what fictional changes they (can) undergo. Ideally, fictional changes come in a variety of sorts. Some are endowed with existential import, namely the creation and the annihilation of fictional settings; others are less dramatic in character. Such are, for instance, the changes by which a setting acquires or loses some fictional truths without either entering or passing out of existence. It is an interesting philosophical question whether all these fictional changes are-or at least can be-exemplified. With the exception of creations that, by Origin, must occur at least once in the life of any existing setting, TFM is neutral on 14 Walton (1990, p. 87) countenances the possibility that a story comes into existence as a result of purely natural, non-agentive processes; Currie (2010, § 1.4) disagrees. Anyway, we may easily imagine a mischievous author that, in order to falsify Creation, adopts a peculiar, 'random' method of composition that prevents the resulting work from being counted as a deliberate creation. 15 Those readers who are especially at ease with formal definitions and semantic clauses might want to have a look below, to Sect. 3.1-3.3, before reading the remainder of this section.
this stance. For all that has been said so far, however, the most natural answer to the question is in the affirmative.
Be that as it may, we may recognize, among other things, a class of fictional settings that after their creation never acquire any novel fictional truth (call them bounded) and a class of fictional settings that never lose any fictional truth (conservative). We may also have settings that are both bounded and conservative, that is, that after their creation never undergo any fictional change (temporally frozen). Many philosophers think that literary works and other object-like settings are temporally frozen in this sense: make a change in the content of, say, a novel, and what you obtain is just another, numerically distinct work. It is worth noting that temporally frozen settings need not be modally frozen; that is, they need not have the same content at all points at which they exist.
Fictional settings may also be classified depending on their relationships with agency or the mode of their creation. Two examples should suffice. First, we shall say that a setting f is fully controlled if, for each fictional truth of f , some agent deliberately sees to it that it would be a fictional truth of f . Insofar as fictional truths need not be part of the explicit content of a setting (see above, p. 4), it is far from obvious that any ordinary work of fiction is fully controlled in this sense (we shall return to fully controlled settings in the next section). Second, we shall call a fictional setting linear if, after its creation, it is inevitable that it undergoes the fictional changes it actually undergoes. In slightly more formal terms, when f is linear, if f exists and it is historically possible that A and B will be, at successive moments, fictional truths of f , then it will be the case that, if f exists, A and B are fictional truths of f at successive moments. Frozen settings are trivially linear. But there are non-frozen settings, such as theatrical and narrative performances, that one might want to classify as linear settings. This is especially so if one regards the order in which certain fictional events are represented during a performance as essential to that performance (for instance, if one thinks that a Hamlet performance in which the second act precedes the first is essentially distinct from any conventionally ordered performance).
1.4 A short summary of the proposal Before discussing some of the possible applications of the proposal outlined in the previous section, it may be useful to summarize the proposal and to address a general concern one might have about it.
A certain conception of fiction-making lies at the heart of the proposal, which I have called the content-choice conception. In the content-choice conception, a fictionmaking performance is understood as a sequence of human actions that occurs during a finite interval of time and results in certain fictional changes. A fictional change is a change in the content of a work of fiction, a make-believe game, or, more generally, a fictional setting. There may be different types of fictional change. For instance, a fictional change may simply consist of the creation of a setting. Typically, an agent introduces a fictional change by deliberately seeing to it that some proposition is a fictional truth of some settings. All fictional settings come into existence (or take place) by virtue of deliberate actions. (However, it is not generally required that all fictional changes occur by virtue of deliberate actions.) In the content-choice conception, a fiction-making act is represented just in terms of the consequences it has on the content of some setting, that is, in terms of the fictional changes it results in. Given a certain level of idealization and some reasonable assumptions, it is possible to specify a formal framework in which fiction-making can be formally studied and to define an axiomatic theory, TFM, that encodes what is essential to the content-choice conception.
The above-mentioned general concern is this: In a conception that is traditionally associated with stit-logics, an action is thought of as the contribution of an agent to a change in the causal structure of the world; but is there not a contrast between this traditional conception and the content-choice conception, in which actions may also result in fictional changes? Should we regard fiction-making acts as strange, sui generis actions?
I think that the answer to these two questions is a qualified no. First, recall that a fictional change is a change in the content of some fictional setting. It is a consequence of very common views in the philosophy of language and mind that changes in content (globally) supervene on changes in the causal structure of the world. If so, then the content-choice conception, far from being incompatible with the traditional conception, actually entails it. Second, to adopt the content-choice conception we do not need to regard fiction-making acts as actions of an especially strange or peculiar sort. Think of speech acts, for instance. A promise, say, can also be understood as an action that may result in a change in content, that is, in the content of an agent's moral obligations (see Belnap et al. 2001, pp. 98-129 for a stit analysis of promising that goes in this direction). This is not to deny that the role of content in an overall causal picture of the world is controversial and not well-understood. But this is an extremely general problem, which affects a variety of positions in the philosophy of language and mind, and by no means specific to the content-choice conception.
Applications, and beyond
The formal framework outlined thus far has some obvious applications in the logic of fiction, make-believe, and fiction-making. For instance, it is especially suited for modeling reasonings that are partly about the content of a setting and partly about the agents that operate over or in that setting. These include, for instance, inferences that lead from internal sentences to conclusions about a certain author's mind or attitude and vice versa. As another example, we may have reasonings that concern make-believe games and their principles of generation-including the ones Mark Richard (2000) would classify as piggy backing. The principles of generation of a setting and their inferential role may be modeled as well, for instance by letting them correspond to (non-logical) axioms of suitable extensions of TFM. Moreover, of course, the proposal is subject to a variety of limitations, the most apparent being those that directly or indirectly depend on the expressive poverty of L.
There also are less obvious applications and limitations, though. This section provides a guided tour through some of these. It is not just a complement to the proposal, however, and is understood to have independent interest for all those concerned with the language, logic, and metaphysics of fiction-making.
Modeling philosophical debates about fiction
In the framework outlined in the previous section, it is possible to formulate different philosophical conceptions of fictional settings and fiction-making and to formally check their consequences, their mutual consistency, and so on.
For example, according to Amie Thomasson (1999, pp. 9-10) some or maybe even all existing works of fiction (object-like settings) could pass out of existence. This view may be expressed in L as a (canonical) schema, and the same goes for the contrary stance that all existing works of fiction will last forever. As another example, suppose you maintain, disputably, that object-like fictional settings are modally frozen. In TFM, we may prove that, if a setting is modally frozen, then it is also fully controlled. Thus, if your view is correct, we may conclude, somewhat surprisingly, that all object-like fictional settings are fully controlled. Finally, consider the view that fiction-making consists, at least typically, in deliberately changing the content of a setting f in a stepwise manner over a certain (non-null) amount of time. We might call this a contentmodeling conception of fiction-making. (The content-modeling conception entails the content-choice conception, but is not to be confused with it.) In our framework, it is easy to show that, if a content-modeling conception is correct for some setting f , then f is non-linear.
It is interesting to note that, due to the generality of the notion of a fictional setting, a content-modeling conception of fiction-making may be correct even if all ordinary, object-like works are linear. Let us see why. Consider an object-like work of fiction, say Jane Austen's Persuasion, and the following sentence: We may all agree that (5), suitably understood, is true. A way of accounting for the truth of (5) is simply to admit that the very novel, Persuasion, is non-linear. We are not forced to this view, however, for there are at least two alternative possibilities. We might either adopt a counterpart-theoretic approach or argue that, in (5), (more or less implicit) reference is made to whatever possible novel shares with Persuasion a certain initial trait of its history of production. Either way, what turns out to be relevant for the truth of (5) is not just a single novel, Persuasion, but, rather, an entity we might describe as a function from points (moment/history pairs) to possible novels. Let us call this entity a non-linear expansion of Persuasion (if you think Persuasion is itself non-linear, you can take it as a non-linear expansion of itself). 16 Intuitively, a nonlinear expansion of a novel may be thought of as a tree whose 'branches' correspond to alternative choices of composition. Now, nothing in the notion of a fictional setting prevents us from regarding a non-linear expansion of a novel as a fictional setting itself. As a result, we might consistently adopt a content-modeling conception of novel-making and, at the same time, hold that Persuasion is linear. We can do so if we distinguish the result of Austen's novel-making performance, Persuasion, from an entity whose contents may be different at different moments and depend, in a stepwise manner, on Austen's choices of composition. The latter entity is, of course, an appropriate non-linear expansion of Persuasion.
Extending the paraphrase thesis
The paraphrase thesis (PT) (see above, Sect. 1.1), suitably understood, is very plausible. However, it has limited scope, for internal sentences are but a small fragment of our common fictional discourse: a number of sentences that concern fictional settings and their content are not meant to express a fictional truth (a standard example, which we shall not deal with here, is "Holmes is a fictional character," but there are many others). Let us call these sentences non-internal. Providing an adequate representation of the commitments triggered by non-internal sentences is generally regarded as a major challenge for any theory of fictional discourse (see, e.g., Kroon and Voltolini 2011 ). If we let our 'fictionality' operator have plausible inferential relationships with stit operators and other sentential operators, however, it is possible to extend the paraphrase thesis to analyze a variety of non-internal sentences. Let us see how.
It has been observed that certain statements about fictional characters and events display a characteristic ambiguity, which is naturally understood to be structural in character (see, e.g., Currie 2003) . Consider, for instance: (6) Mickey Mouse will be wearing gloves.
We may take (6) as an internal sentence. But imagine it in Disney's mouth before the production of The Opry House, the movie in which Mickey first appeared with gloves on. If so, you are likely to understand (6) as saying, roughly speaking, that the proposition that Mickey wears gloves will be a fictional truth of some future work. This latter, non-internal reading of (6) may be made explicit as: (6 ) It will be the case that (M (Mickey Mouse wears gloves)).
Intuitively, (6 ) may be obtained from a natural analysis of (6); that is: (6 ) It will be the case that Mickey Mouse wears gloves.
by replacing the occurrence of (1) ("Mickey Mouse wears gloves") with a standard, 'fictionality' paraphrase. Furthermore, (1)-as it occurs in (6 )-clearly expresses a fictional truth, so it is reasonable to regard it as internal. These remarks strongly suggest that (PT) may be generalized to apply to occurrences of internal sentences in larger linguistic constructions. The following is an adequate, if rough (see note 5), formulation of this generalized version (where Op is a possibly empty sequence of monadic sentential operators and B is not already in the scope of a 'fictionality' operator):
Op(B) and B is an internal sentence, then A Op(M(B)). In certain circumstances, when it is clear that B is internal to f , A Op(M f (B)).
It is apparent that (GPT) enables us to deal with statements to which the paraphrase thesis (PT) does not apply. An example may be, of course, (6). Other, more interesting examples shall be introduced in the next section.
Control statements and the creation problem
If in the first act you have hung a pistol on the wall, then in the following one it should be fired. Otherwise don't put it there.
Anton Chechov
We often say or imply that a certain author brought about certain fictional events or made her/his characters act or look in such and such a way, or the like. For instance, we may claim that Conan Doyle made Holmes die or, in a somewhat more metaphorical fashion, that: (7) Conan Doyle killed Holmes.
Statements of this sort might be called control sentences, for they seem to ascribe to authors of fiction a (sort of) causal control over certain characters and states of affairs portrayed in their works. Needless to say, control sentences have very puzzling consequences. For this reason, it is very plausible to hold that, when we assert them, we do not commit ourselves to their literal truth. (For instance, nobody would take the 'killing' of Holmes to be morally blameworthy.) If so, we have the problem of specifying as clearly as possible what they actually commit us to. This is a problem that, at least for a considerable number of control sentences, receives an immediate and elegant solution in our framework. Let us see how.
Nuances aside, many control sentences may be paraphrased as sentences of the following form (where A concerns purely fictional characters or states of affairs and is internal to some work authored by α):
(NF) α sees (saw, will see) to it that it will (would) be the case that A.
If a statement is thus paraphrasable, we shall say that it is a normal control sentence. Now, the Generalized Paraphrase Thesis (GPT) enables us to paraphrase claims of form (NF) as: α sees (saw, will see) to it that it will (would) be fictionally the case that A.
As an example, consider again (7). Arguably, nothing of importance is lost if we paraphrase (7) as: (7 ) Conan Doyle saw to it that it would be the case that Holmes died.
Since "Holmes died" is apparently internal to a work by Conan Doyle, we may conclude that (7) is a normal control sentence. If so, it is usefully paraphrased as: (7 ) Conan Doyle saw to it that it would be fictionally the case that Holmes died.
The same strategy obviously applies to any other normal control sentence we may choose. It is worth noting that a paraphrase like (7 ) Let us label intuitively true statements like (8), in which an author α is said to create or bring into existence a fictional character of some work authored by α, as creation sentences. Some philosophers, so-called creationists about fictional characters, think that creation sentences are literally true (see, e.g., van Inwagen 1977; Salmon 1998; Thomasson 1999; Kripke 2011 ). Other philosophers disagree. A common view among the latter is fictionalism about creation sentences (see, e.g., Walton 1990; Brock 2002) . Fictionalists hold that creation sentences are on a par with ordinary internal sentences like (2) ("Holmes met Watson in a lab"), with a single difference. Namely, creation sentences are not internal to standard fictional works but to more exotic fictional settings. For instance, according to Walton (1990, pp. 410-411) , creation statements are internal to "unofficial" make-believe games in which "to author a fiction about people and things of certain kinds is fictionally to create such."
Both creationism and fictionalism are questionable. The former relies on objectionable metaphysical assumptions (see, e.g., Yagisawa 2001; Everett 2005; Brock 2010 ); the latter is dubiously explicative (for instance, Thomasson (2003) observes that, by appeal to ad hoc make-believe games we could, in principle, 'explain away' any commonsense intuition we pleased; see also Stanley (2001) and, for a reply, Everett (2013), pp. 103-108) . If the above treatment of control sentences goes in the right direction, however, a third, alternative approach to creation sentences immediately suggests itself. Clearly, (8) may be paraphrased as:
(8 ) Conan Doyle saw to it that it would be the case that Holmes existed.
Since "Holmes existed" is naturally regarded as an internal statement-and internal to Conan Doyle's works-it is equally natural to understand (8) as a normal control sentence. If so, (8) is amenable to the same treatment as (7) (on the analogy between creation statements and statements like (7) see Kroon (2011), pp. 219-221 and Everett (2013), pp. 58-60) . 17 This style of analysis involves no questionable metaphysical assumptions, or at least no more than fictionalism itself does, and deals uniformly-and without invoking ad hoc maneuvers-with a very large array of puzzling statements, over and above creation sentences. It is not clear whether any competing approach achieves as much. 17 It might be objected that Agilulf, the nonexistent knight of the eponym novel by Italo Calvino, provides a counter-example to this analysis. The reason is that it appears that Agilulf has been created by Calvino even though in the story he is nonexistent. This objection has some initial plausibility, but it does not stand close scrutiny. Like any other character of a fictional work, in the work Agilulf is an agent, and as such has a number of existence-entailing properties (being sentient, having causal efficacy, and so on). Thus either the story is inconsistent, and Agilulf both exists and does not exist therein, or "nonexistent" is to be understood in a somewhat idiosyncratic way, for instance as a synonym of "immaterial." Either way, the counter-example is blocked.
Limits and prospects for future work
The present proposal is a formal study on human agency and fictional truth. As such, it imposes relatively mild constraints on fiction-making and it should not be regarded as an alternative to more substantial views on the nature of fictional works and related performances. Rather, it is thought to be compatible with (and possibly complementary to) very different takes on these matters. 18 A discussion of how precisely the proposal interacts with such different views would considerably clarify its limits and ambitions. However, this is a discussion that has to be left to another occasion. Here, three cursory remarks should suffice.
First, the content-choice conception shares an individualistic stance that is characteristic of multi-agent stit logics (and to a lesser extent of group stit logics, too). For instance, it abstracts away from those social and cultural facts, broadly conceived, that may affect the choices of an author and, therefore, the properties of the work. Undoubtedly, this is an idealization. But one may also regard it as a considerable limitation, especially if one's favorite conception of fiction, or one's favorite ontology of artworks, assigns a key role to such social and cultural backgrounds.
Second, as previously mentioned, standard stit logics assign no role to intentions, and TFM is no exception to the rule. Thus, in the picture of fiction-making I have drawn so far, we cannot make sense of an author intending to produce a fictional change (of course, unless the author succeeds in doing so). This restriction depends, ultimately, on limitations of the underlying stit framework, and there is no principled reason to suppose it cannot be overcome (see, e.g., Broersen 2011). But intentions come with considerable complications, and whether the price is worth the effort may depend, again, on one's overall conception of fictional or representational artworks.
Finally, what I have called fictional settings constitute a variegate plurality, which may include artifacts, performances, but also communicative contexts and systems of rules. Arguably, even those stories (myths, daydreams, and so on) we are told about within fictional works correspond to (actual) fictional settings. This variety may be startling from an ontological viewpoint, and one might feel that something substantial remains to be said on the nature of fictional settings, their identity, and their relationship with 'ordinary' fictional works. Actually, I think that such relative indeterminacy of the proposal adds to it in terms of generality, but I am happy to recognize that there is more work to be done in this area.
The Theory TFM
This section is mainly devoted to a formal definition of the theory TFM and to a proof of completeness for it. Informal comments are kept to a minimum, for the theory has been already outlined in Sect. 1. As stated above (p. 8), the semantics of TFM is based upon OTF frames, which are standard Kripke frames. Moments, histories, choices, and contents (of fictional settings) are defined in terms of points and accessibility relations between points. Frame properties are always expressed with reference to points and relations between them, but in many cases, a (frame-equivalent) reformulation in terms of moments, histories, instants, choices, or contents is provided for the sake of clarity and intuitiveness. 19 
Syntax
Definition 1
The language L of TFM may be formally specified as:
Usual definitions hold for ⊥, , →, ∨ and the duals H , G,
, respectively. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, the operator of fictional truth M f i is defined as:
and its 'generic' counterpart M as:
and its 'existential' counterpart [Dstit] as:
Frame definitions
Definition 6 An OTF (Ockhamist) frame is a tuple
-K is a non-empty set of points. We let x, y, . . . vary over points.
-< is a union of disjoint irreflexive linear orders on K that are unbounded to the left and to the right. We let > be the converse relation of < and be the reflexive closure of <. Maximal linearly ordered components of < are called histories. We let h (possibly with indices) vary over histories.
-≈ and ∼ are equivalence relations on K ; equivalence classes modulo ≈ are called moments; equivalence classes modulo ∼ are called instants. We let m vary over moments. Moreover we have that:
(TREE) If x ∼ y then there exist points x x and y y such that x ≈ y . Intuitively, this property corresponds to the above mentioned Tree condition (p. 5). (IRR) If x ∼ y then x ≯ y. Intuitively, no instant intersects any history at more than one point (or moment). (NIN) If x ≈ y then x ∼ y. Intuitively, if two points are in the same moment, they are in the same instant. (MB) If x = y and x ≈ y, then there exists points x > x and y > x such that x ≈ y . Intuitively, distinct histories are bound to branch.
Definition 7 (Instants and points: notation) By IRR and NIN, it immediately follows that, for each m, h, m ∩ h has at most one point x as its element. We write m/ h only if m ∩ h is nonempty, to denote the unique point x ∈ m ∩ h.
Definition 8 (Order of moments)
We write m ≺ m ("m precedes m ") iff, for some h, m/ h < m / h; m m ("m follows m ") is defined in the obvious way. Once ≺ is so defined, histories may be also conceived as maximal ≺-connected sets of moments.
(SYNCHRONICITY) If x[<∼]y then x[∼<]z and if x[>∼]y then x[∼>]z.
Intuitively, instants preserve the order of moments toward both the past and the future.
-AG is a set of equivalence relations A , α 1 , . . . , α t on K . Relations α 1 ,…, α t correspond, intuitively, to distinct agents. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, k ∈ {1, . . . , t}, and each point x (also indicated as m/ h) we have that:
Definition 10 (Choices) The set Choice 
In other words, for any moment m, any arbitrary sequence including exactly one possible choice Choice α k m for each k ∈ {1, . . . , t} has a non-empty intersection.
STITEX is best understood in connection with the corresponding axiom StitEx (see below, p. 23). As for NOCH and INDAG, see above (p. 7). It is worth noting that the formal constraint corresponding to the above (p. 5) No backward branching condition is entailed by NSTIT, STITEX and NOCH.
-F is a set of relations f 1 , . . . , f s on K that, intuitively, correspond to fictional settings. As said above (in Sect. 1.3), we assume that at any point m/ h, each fictional setting f i has a (possibly vacuous) content, which we represent as a (possibly empty) set of histories. 
These properties correspond to the basic postulates outlined above (p. 10). Observe that, by constraint (NTS) and given how the notion of content is defined, we have that, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, relation f i holds between m/ h and a point m / h iff (a) h is in the content of f i at m/ h and (b) m is in the same instant as m.
Models and Semantic Clauses
Definition 11 An OTF model (based) on an OTF frame F is a pair M = F,V and V is a valuation function such that, for all p ∈ ATOM, V ( p) ⊆ K , and:
. This condition ensures that propositional atoms "have no trace of futurity in them" (see above, p. 6).
The semantic clauses are as follows (M, x A reads "A is true in M at x"):
Calculus
Rules
Irr is a Gabbay-style (1981) irreflexivity rule and corresponds to property IRR.
Axioms
For any k ∈ {1, . . . , t}, i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, we have the following axiom schemata:
1. The usual axiom schemata of tense logic with serial linear time orderings: 
No independency claim attaches to this axiomatization. Groups 1-2 need no presentation. As for the other groups, each axiom provided with a label is canonical for (a property equivalent to) the homonymous frame property, if any. So, for instance, Origin is canonical for the above frame property ORIGIN. Prop is an exception in that it corresponds to a condition on models (PROP). All the axioms in group 4 except StitEx are familiar from standard stit logic. StitEx is strictly tied to the intended reading of a sentence [Stit] A, that is, "[α k stit]A for some k ∈ {1, . . . , t}." The axioms in group 5 are nothing but (the formal counterparts of) the four basic postulates introduced in Sect. 1.3 (p. 10).
Additional constraints
In Sect. 1.3 we have discussed some additional constraints that can be imposed on a setting f to ensure that f satisfies certain properties (being objectual, being bounded, and so on). Each of these constraints corresponds to a schema of canonical formulae of L (and so also to a frame property), namely:
Completeness
Throughout this section, completeness means completeness with respect to the OTF models. The proof that TFM is sound for OTF-validity is easy and is left to the reader. Aim of this section is to prove a completeness theorem for TFM. The proof is less than straightforward, as some complications are required to deal with the irreflexivity rule Irr. The strategy of proof is conceptually similar to that in (Zanardo 1991) , but the terminology is mainly drawn from the classic (Blackburn et al. 2001, see esp. § 4.6) . At its core, the proof consists of a step-by-step construction, by which an OTF model is shown to exist for each consistent formula of L. Before the construction may begin, however, there is some preliminary work to be done. . . . , R (s+t+5) . Let R j be such that 1 j (t + s + 5) and let j ([ j] ) indicate the diamond (box) of L having R j as its accessibility relation. Let Δ, Γ, Σ, . . . range over maximal consistent sets of formulas (MCSs). For each R j , we define the following relation on the set of MCSs:
Preliminary definitions and results
Let us suppose that the relation symbols
We shall say that R j is the canonical correlate of R j (<, >, ≈, . . . , denote the canonical correlate of <, >, ≈, . . . , respectively). It is straightforward to show that, for each R j :
Furthermore, since TFM is a normal modal logic, we know by standard results (see, e.g., Blackburn et al. 2001, pp. 200-203) 
, which is equivalent to π 0 → ¬A. Since p 0 does not occur in A, by Irr we have ¬A, which contradicts the consistency of X + and hence, by Proposition 2, of X .
Definition 13
A rectangle is a sequence Δ 1 , . . . , Δ n , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n of MCSs such that, Fig. 2 ).
Definition 14
The rectangle Δ * 1 , . . . , Δ * n , Γ * 1 , . . . , Γ * n is said to be auxiliary to the
Since we know that the axioms for σ are complete with respect to S5 validities, and the axioms for P, F with respect to linear time validities, we shall freely use these validities as theorems. In particular, we have:
Now we are in a position to prove the following: For i = 2 to n, consider an arbitrary formula γ ∈ Γ * i . Since π 0 ↔ σ π 0 is a theorem and π 0 ∈ Γ * i , the formula P(γ ∧ π 0 ) ∈ Δ * i and P(γ + ∧ π 1 ) ∈ Δ * * i . Observe that Pπ 1 ∈ Ψ i because Pπ 1 ∈ Ψ 1 and Pπ i ↔ σ Pπ i is a theorem. Then, by ( * * ), P(γ + ∧ π 1 ) ∈ Ψ i . This implies that there exists a MCE Γ * * i of Γ * + i 
. Finally, the effect of the exchange is that every
Completeness theorem
Now we shall proceed step-by-step (see Blackburn et al. 2001, §4.6) , as follows. First we shall pair up certain finite frames, which are thought to approximate OTF frames, with functions from points to MCSs and from rectangles to auxiliary rectangles, to obtain (what we shall label as) networks. Then we shall let networks correspond to special, induced models. Finally, we shall show that each consistent formula of L is true in some induced model.
where K is a (possibly finite) set of points, <, ∼, . . . , f s are relations on K , 20 L is a labelling function from points in K to MCSs and ρ is a possibly partial function from rectangles to auxiliary rectangles (see . F N = (K , <, ≈, ∼, AG, F) is said to be the underlying frame of N .
Definition 16
A network N is coherent if: 
Definition 17
Definition 18 A network N is saturated if: Definition 19 A network is perfect if it is both coherent and saturated.
Definition 20 Let N be a network with underlying frame
Lemma 3 (Truth lemma) If N is a perfect network with induced model
Proof Straightforward, by induction on A.
Now it should be clear enough that all is needed to prove that TFM is complete is to show that, for any consistent A, it is possible to construct a perfect network N such that A ∈ L(x) for some x ∈ K . Before starting the construction let us define six defects a network may have, which correspond to failures of the saturation conditions (S1)-(S6). Let N = (K , <, ≈, ∼, { A , α 1 , . . . , α t }, { f 1 , . . . , f Proof Let N = (K , <, ≈, ∼, { A , α 1 , . . . , α t }, { f 1 , . . . , f s }, L , ρ) be a finite, coherent network having some defect. We have to prove that all these defects may be repaired. To this aim, we consider, in turn, defects of each sort (S1)-(S6) and show how to define a coherent extension N of N lacking the defects.
Definition 21
(S1)-defects: (S1)-defects come in seven different sorts, depending on which Ldiamond, or family of L-diamonds, they involve. We shall deal with them separately.
(P) Let (u, PA) be an (S1)-defect, i.e., PA ∈ L(u) but A / ∈ L(x) for all x < u. Consider the unique point u 1 u such that (u 1 , PA) is an (S1)-defect, and for all x < u 1 , (x, PA) is not an (S1)-defect. Assume that u 1 is not <-minimal, that is, x < u 1 for some x ∈ K . Let w 1 be the immediate <-predecessor of u 1 . . We know by (C1), (C6) that Σ 1 ≈ Σ i for i = 2 to n. If Σ ≈ Σ 1 , we stop here. Otherwise, to restore coherence, we must add a new bottom row of points z, z 1 , . . . , z n such that L (z) ≈ L (z 1 ) ≈ . . . ≈ L (z n ), as in the above (S1)-P defects. Again, this part of the proof is left to the reader, along with the definition of the repaired network. (♦, ♦ f i , α k stit , Stit ) These defects can be treated in analogy with (S1)-♦ σ defects. (S2)-(S6)-defects: Let u be an (S2)-defect; we can suppose without loss of generality that there exists no y < u. Since, by Axioms 1, P ∈ L(u), our (S2)-defects boils down to the (S1)-defect (u, P ). By similar reasonings, it is straightforward to show that any (S3)-(S6)-defect boils down to one or more suitable (S1)-defects.
Theorem 1 TFM is strongly complete.
Proof Let X be a consistent set of formulae. Consider any MCS Δ ⊇ X . Given a point u, let N 0 be a network such that K 0 = {u}, < = ∅, ≈ = ∼ = A = α 1 = . . . = α t = {(u, u)}, f i = ∅ for all i, L 0 = {(u, Δ)}, and ρ 0 = ∅. Trivially, N 0 is finite and coherent. Our aim is to show that it is possible to extend it step-by-step up to a perfect network N . Let S be a countable set of points such that u ∈ S (intuitively, these are the points we shall use in the construction). We start by enumerating the set of potential defects we might encounter in the process (where, for instance, the set of potential (S1)-P defects is {(x, PA) : x ∈ S and A is a formula of L}). Then we let d 0 be the defect of N that is minimal in our enumeration. By Lemma 4, we can obtain a repaired network N 1 lacking defect d 0 . Then, for any network N n , we may consider the defect d of N n that is minimal in our enumeration and obtain, by Lemma 4, a repaired network N n+1 lacking that defect. Observe that d does not affect any extension of N n+1 . By standard results, we conclude that there exists a perfect network N such that L (x) = Δ for some x ∈ K . Therefore, by Lemma 3, M , x A for any A ∈ X .
